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I. International Migration in Context 
 
According to the United Nations and the OECD, more than 230 
million people were living outside their countries of birth in 2013 
with an additional 700 million migrating internally within their 
countries (UN DESA and OECD 2013).  Current research and 
analysis has suggested that in the coming decades, demographic 
changes, increasing globalisation in a context of growing 
international inequality and climate change will significantly 
increase migration pressures within and across borders, at least in 
the short to medium term (see, for example UNDP 2009, IOM 
2010, OECD 2007 and 2009).   
 
In his report to the UN General Assembly in July 2013, the UN 
Secretary General summarised the current context succinctly: 
 
‘Migration continues to increase in scope, complexity 
and impact. Demographic transition, economic growth and 
the recent financial crisis are reshaping the face of 
migration. At the heart of this phenomenon are human 
beings in search of decent work and a better or safer life. 
Across the globe, millions are able to move, live and work 
in safety and dignity. Yet others are compelled to move 
owing to poverty, violence and conflict, or environmental 
changes, and many face exploitation, abuse and other 
human rights violations along the way’  
 
(UN General Assembly, July 2013: 3-4)  
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Migration is set to remain a key challenge for human 
development and human rights in the coming decades. 
 
Of today’s 232 million international migrants, 59% currently 
live in regions of the Developed World; between 2000 and 2013, 
the estimated number of such migrants increased by 32 million 
and by 2013 made up nearly 11% of total population (up from 9% 
in 2000). This contrasts with some 2% in developing regions 
where between 2000 and 2013, the migrant population living and 
originating in Developing World regions increased by almost 23 
million.  In the same period the migrant population from 
developing countries now living in the Developed World increased 
by more than 24 million (IOM 2013). 
 
There are a number of important patterns and trends within 
these broad figures which benefit from closer scrutiny and which 
are significant in terms of current debates and political agendas; 
these include: 
 
• Of the estimated 232 million migrants worldwide, some 10-
15% are ‘unauthorised’ or illegal with the concept itself 
becoming increasingly contested.  
 
• Overall, 22% of movement represents ‘North to North’ 
migration; 5% is North to South; 33% is South to South 
migration and 40% is South to North.  
 
• South-South migration is now as common as South-North 
migration - in 2013, about 82.3 million international 
migrants who were born in the South were residing in the 
South, which is slightly higher than the 81.9 million 
international migrants originating in the South and living in 
the North. 
 
• Asians living outside of their home regions form the largest 
global migrant group with those from Latin America and the 
Caribbean representing the second largest. Europe and Asia 
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combined host nearly two-thirds of all international 
migrants worldwide with Europe remaining the most 
popular destination with 72 million migrants in 2013, 
compared to 71 million in Asia.  
 
• International migration remains highly concentrated - in 
2013, half of all international migrants lived in 10 countries 
with the US hosting the largest number (45.8 million), 
followed by the Russian Federation (11 million); Germany 
(9.8 million); Saudi Arabia (9.1 million); United Arab 
Emirates (7.8 million); United Kingdom (7.8 million); 
France (7.4 million); Canada (7.3 million); Australia (6.5 
million); and Spain (6.5 million). 
 
• The North, or developed countries, is home to 136 million 
international migrants, compared to 96 million in the South, 
or developing countries. Most international migrants are of 
working age (20 to 64 years) and account for 74% of the 
total. Globally, women account for 48% of all international 
migrants.  
 Source: IOM World Migration Report 2013, Geneva, 62 
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South – North Origin Destination Number 
of 
Migrants 
% of total  
S-N 
1 Mexico United States 12,189,15
8 
12.8 
2 Turkey Germany 2,819,326 3.0 
3 China United States 1,956,523 2.1 
4 Philippines United States 1,850,067 1.9 
5 India United States 1,556,641 0.7 
     
North - North    % of N-N 
1 Germany United States 1,283,108 4.0 
2 United Kingdom Australia 1,097,893 3.5 
3 Canada United States 1,037,187 3.0 
4 Korea, Rep. of United States 1,030,561 2.8 
5 United kingdom United States 901,916 2.5 
     
South - South    % of S-S 
1 Ukraine Russian Fed. 3,662,722 4.9 
2 Russian Fed. Ukraine 3,524,669 4.7 
3 Bangladesh India 3,190,769 4.2 
4 Kazakhstan Russian Fed. 2,648,316 3.5 
5 Afghanistan Pakistan 2,413,395 3.2 
     
North - South    % of N-S 
1 United States Mexico 563,315 7.8 
2 Germany Turkey 306,459 4.3 
3 United States South Africa 252,311 3.5 
4 Portugal Brazil 222,148 3.1 
5 Italy Argentina 198,319 2.8 
Source: IOM World Migration Report 2013, Geneva, 62 
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II. Migration and Development – Some Key Issues and 
Debates 
 
There are very few areas in international development research 
and policy where there is almost total agreement among informed 
commentators and analysts yet as regards international migration 
and its impact on development there is such agreement. The 
consensus was reflected in the UNDP Human Development 
Report 2009 which argued that: 
 
‘…research has found that while migration can, in 
certain circumstances, have negative effects on locally born 
workers with comparable skills, the body of evidence 
suggests that these effects are generally small and may, in 
some contexts, be entirely absent… this report argues that 
migrants boost economic output, at little or no cost to 
locals…’  
(UNDP 2009:3) 
 
This view is echoed by the World Bank (2014) which notes 
that: 
‘…International migration boosts world incomes. By 
allowing workers to move to where they are more 
productive, migration results in an increase in aggregate 
output and income…’. 
 
This assessment is shared by a diverse range of authors and 
institutions including Cohen (2008), Naerssen, Spaan and 
Zoomers (2008), Castles and Millar (2009), Rodrik (2011), 
Martins, Glennie & Mustapha (2013), the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development (2012), Castles, De Haas and Millar 
(2014) and others. Such analyses have highlighted that while there 
may be limited and, usually short-term negative impacts from 
migration in both recipient and sending countries, the overall 
impact is positive at a variety of levels – the role of remittances in 
international development, circular migration and the impact of 
returned migrants, the brain ‘drain and gain’, the role of migrant 
networks in recipient countries socially and culturally and their 
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contribution to economic development locally etc. (see van 
Naerssen, Spaan and Zoomers 2008:5-8). In terms of human 
development over the past century, migration has transformed the 
opportunities of literally millions of poor people internationally 
(UNDP 2009:28-33). 
 
Despite this overall positive assessment, debate on migration 
today is dominated by the impact of the economic failures and 
crises affecting western countries and is most frequently 
referenced in terms of the challenges faced by recipient countries 
primarily those in Europe rather than those faced by recipient 
countries in the developing world. Migration to Europe is 
currently the subject of increasingly restrictive legislation – a 
reality that stands in stark contrast to the dominant economic 
theories in support of the increased liberalisation of markets, trade 
and other economic flows (Alonso 2011). While private capital 
increases its global mobility and moves with increased ease across 
national and international borders and as barriers to trade continue 
to be reduced, labour mobility remains contained by restrictive 
policies and procedures (ILO 2014). This contrast highlights the 
unequal character of the globalisation process dominant today, a 
process with profound implications for migration.   
 
The implications of the current dominant focus as regards 
migration have been highlighted by the ILO in the following 
(human rights) terms: 
 
‘…migration has moved centre stage in national, 
regional and global policy agendas, bringing with it not 
only a sense of urgency in societies and among decision-
makers, but also a set of controversies which can be 
damaging to social coherence if left unaddressed…despite 
the positive experiences that can and should be cited, 
migration is still too frequently associated with 
unacceptable labour abuses in the face of which inaction is 
an abdication of responsibility…’  
(ILO 2014:3) 
 151 
The human rights dimension to the debate was also highlighted 
by the UN Secretary General: 
 
‘Too few channels exist for legal migration. The human 
rights of migrants, therefore, are compromised. Millions 
travel, live and work outside the protection of laws. As a 
result, those who exploit migrants - smugglers and 
traffickers, unscrupulous recruiters and corrupt employers - 
are empowered. We must begin building an adaptable 
system of international migration that responds to the 
realities of the twenty-first century.” 
 
(UN General Assembly, July 2013:2) 
 
The UNDP, ODI, World Bank and the ILO have variously 
outlined a broad framework for both national and international 
policies and treaties to address the issues through, for example 
opening up existing entry channels; ensuring basic rights for 
migrants; lowering migration transaction costs; researching 
solutions that benefit destination and migrant communities and 
making it easier for people to move within the own countries 
(UNDP 2009:95-112). One common theme characterises many 
such reports and proposals – addressing the migration issue solely 
from the perspective of the recipient countries in the developed 
world without considering the contexts, needs and rights of 
migrants especially poor migrants (and their countries and regions 
of origin), is neither practical or just and will certainly not achieve 
stated objectives. As Glennie & Turton (2014) observe: 
 
‘…as with the drugs debate, as with climate change and 
energy consumption, as with cheap clothes, so with 
immigration: the way rich country policies affect others far 
away should be taken into account more fully as those 
policies are devised and implemented.’  
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Similarly, the World Bank observed: 
 
‘The negative portrayal of migration can foster policies 
that seek to reduce and control its incidence and do little to 
address the needs of those who migrate, when migration 
may be the only option for those affected by climate 
hazards. Indeed, policies designed to restrict migration 
rarely succeed, are often self-defeating, and increase the 
costs to migrants and to communities of origin and 
destination.’  
(World Bank, 2010:25) 
 
A number of additional themes characterise much discussion of 
the migration issue worldwide – those of resource flows, 
remittances and aid; changing international demographics and 
their implications for migration, the impact of the ‘brain drain’ on 
migrant donor countries (and recent proposals to compensate 
them), future international strategies for managing migration and 
the tensions between individual country perceptions and realities, 
‘environmental migration’ and the need for internationally co-
ordinated policy and action. A final theme of increasing 
importance is the diverse and often contradictory public 
perceptions and attitudes towards migrants and its influence on 
policy.  Some of these issues are briefly reviewed below. 
 
It is frequently observed that migrant remittances dwarf official 
aid flows to developing countries and, in human development 
terms are often far more effective and targeted (on family, 
community and area needs). According to the World Bank (2014) 
officially recorded remittances to developing countries are 
expected to reach $481 billion in 2014 (rising to an estimated $516 
billion in 2016 with global remittances expected to reach $681 
billion).  In contrast, official aid flows (despite a 6.1% increase in 
2013) remained at $134.8 billion and continue to suffer from 
routine failures to achieve stated targets and from considerable 
levels of fluctuation thereby undermining effectiveness and 
planning (OECD 2013, Reality of Aid 2012).   
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In this context it is also crucial to recognise that, contrary to 
popular opinion, the net direction of resource flows worldwide is 
from Developing to Developed countries. According to IMF 
figures as referenced by the UN Secretary General in 2013, total 
resource transfers from Developing Countries and Emerging 
Economies amounted to $827 billion in 2011 (UNGA 2012:3). 
Within such a context, the key importance of migrant remittances 
as a driver of international human development cannot be 
underestimated and has major implications for the post 2015 MDG 
related agenda (Martins, Glennie & Mustapha, 2013). 
 
Future demographic patterns and their impact on labour 
shortages and opportunities are expected to influence and shape 
migration thereby stimulating the need for national and 
international policy and action (IOM 2011). According to the 
International Organisation for Migration (2010:4) the labour force 
in economically developed countries is projected to remain at 
approximately 600 million until 2050, while the labour force in 
less developed countries is expected to increase to 3.6 billion by 
2040. Poor employment opportunities in developing countries are 
expected to remain the norm under present development models 
until at least 2030 thereby stimulating further the logic of 
migration.   
 
A recent study by Fargues and Bartolemeo explored, inter alia, 
the demographic trends that are likely to challenge the EU in four 
key respects: 
 
• The total population of the EU will decrease or stabilise 
depending upon migration scenarios, while the world’s 
population will continue to steadily increase so that the 
relative demographic weight of the EU will dwindle, 
challenging its role in world affairs. 
• The EU’s workforce will decline in absolute numbers, 
challenging the EU’s production and wealth. If no 
immigration occurs between 2010 and 2030, the EU-27 will 
lose 33 million persons at working age (-11%). 
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• The EU’s welfare systems will become unsustainable due to 
the old-age dependency ratio (65+ / 20-65) jumping from 
28% in 2010 to 44% in 2030 in the no-migration scenario. 
• From 2010 to 2030 with no migration, the population aged 
20-30 will decrease by 25% and the population aged 60-70 
will increase by 29%. Moreover, the ‘ageing of skills’ will 
be amplified by any postponement of the legal age of 
retirement adopted in response to rising old-age dependency 
(Farques and Bartolemeo 2014:3). 
 
While there is little agreement on how many migrants the EU 
might in future require (and under what circumstances), a study by 
Fotakis (2000:6) suggested as many as 170 million migrant 
workers will be required after 2020. These patterns and trends 
have profound implications for migration and for the immediate 
and future shaping of policy and public debate. 
 
 
III. Migration – a Multi-faceted Reality 
 
Neoclassical migration theory tended to focus primarily on the 
individual and viewed the decision to migrate as essentially 
voluntary (see Naerssen, Spaan and Zoomers 2008); research 
today has shifted focus from the individual to the family (families 
utilise migration as an economic survival strategy) and to the view 
that migration is predominantly involuntary (IOM 2014). 
Migration is most likely driven by a variety of factors and this 
reality needs to be addressed in developing migration policies and 
strategies internationally. The complexity and diversity of 
migration cannot be managed by a singular migration policy alone 
– it is a multi-faceted reality requiring responses at a variety of 
levels including responses focused on the development, human 
rights, gender and environmental agendas and not simply those of 
‘security’ and ‘regulation’ (as currently pursued in the EU and 
across Europe).   
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The factors most likely to lead to migration include economic 
realities (the yawning and growing gap in life chances and 
opportunities between countries and regions is paramount 
especially in the context of highly unequal globalisation (Rodrik 
2011, UNDP 2013 and 2014, Piketty 2014) and ‘radical inequality’ 
(Pogge 2008). The lack of effective governance in many countries 
at a variety of levels including in welfare, education and health 
along with intense conflict and violence (in which the West 
continues to play a key role) remains pivotal.  According to 
UNHCR ‘…we are witnessing a quantum leap in forced 
displacement in the world’ with the number of people forced to 
flee now exceeding 50 million in 2013 (UNHCR 2014). 
Additionally, the absence or denial of personal freedom (of belief 
or religion) also forces many to flee along with discrimination of 
various types including race, gender and/or ethnicity.  The 
emergence of organised migrant communities and networks in 
destination countries contributes significantly to migration as well 
to local and international development (Cohen 2008).   
 
Of increasingly urgent importance to migration are 
environmental factors such as earthquakes, floods, soil/coastal 
erosion and droughts related directly to climate change (UNDP 
2009:45, Laczko and Aghazarm 2009). 
   
‘Large numbers of people are moving as a result of 
environmental degradation that has increased dramatically in 
recent years. The number of such migrants could rise substantially 
as larger areas of the earth become uninhabitable as a result of 
climate change.’  
 
(IOM, 1992) 
 
The global rise of the ‘environmental migrant’ (a term first 
coined by Lester Brown) looms large, according to the  
International Organisation for Migration by 2008 some 20 million 
people had been displaced by extreme weather events, compared 
to 4.6 million internally displaced by conflict and violence over 
the same period. Research indicates that gradual changes in the 
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environment tend to have an even greater impact on migration 
than extreme events. Gradual changes, such as desertification, 
coastal and soil erosion, tend to be less dramatic and therefore 
attract less attention than natural disasters. However, such changes 
tend to affect a larger number of people and will continue to do so 
in the long term. For example, during the period 1979-2008, 718 
million people were affected by storms compared to 1.6 billion 
people affected by droughts. Laczko and Aghazarm have 
estimated that by 2050, between 25 million to 1 billion people 
may migrate or be displaced due to environmental degradation and 
climate change (2009:15). Additionally, 1.3 million square 
kilometres are likely to become flooded; developing countries are 
likely to bear the brunt of such events with as much as 98% of all 
human casualties from extreme weather events with South and 
East Asia, Africa and small island states becoming the most 
severely affected (Myers 2002, IOM 2009:33). 
 
 
IV. Inequality, Development Paradigms and Migration 
 
Most recently Thomas Piketty has highlighted the dominant 
assumptions surrounding international inequality and wealth in the 
twentieth century and, in particular the arguments suggesting a 
‘moral hierarchy of wealth’ deemed to explain and justify current 
levels of inequality (2014:443-447). In challenging this paradigm, 
Piketty once again draws attention to the systemic nature of 
inequality under current globalisation conditions. In this, he 
echoes many of the arguments of Pogge concerning ‘radical 
inequality’, which root poverty and injustice in current dominant 
economic models (2008:204-205). The implications of their 
arguments for migration and in particular for the poverty and 
inequalities which drive it are clear. Current economic 
development paradigms, models and practices generate and 
recreate the realities that fuel migration. Separating the issue of 
migration from the forces that drive it is not only unjust, it is also 
unrealistic in that it refuses to recognise underlying dynamics and 
places the core focus on migrants themselves and on the need for 
greater ‘security’ and regulation. 
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How such realities impinge on migration is illustrated in the 
case of sub-Saharan Africa in the context of agriculture and the 
vexed question of the ongoing impact of EU and US subsidies for 
their agricultural exports and their impact in Africa and elsewhere. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN has catalogued 
key elements of how US and EU subsidies on commodities such 
as cotton continue to damage African farmers, reduce much 
needed revenues for African Governments and artificially distort 
world markets (FAO 2007). Analysts and research institutes along 
with developing countries' governments argue that the agricultural 
and trade policies of the world's richest nations are a major 
obstacle to economic development in some of the poorest 
countries globally. For example US and EU food and agricultural 
trade policies and selected export subsidies continue to be used 
regionally to ‘dump’ a broad range of products onto poorer 
country markets contributing to the creation of poverty and 
insecurity and thus migration (IFPRI 2003, FAO 2006 and FAO 
2009). In addressing the reform of its Common Agricultural Policy 
in 2013, the EU continued to refuse to rule out the use of export 
subsidies despite extensive evidence of their negative impact on 
poorer countries (Matthews 2011). In the case of the US, the 
World Trade Organisation in 2005 upheld a ruling against the 
United States declaring export subsidies illegal yet the US 
government continues to resist reform (Kinnock 2011).     
 
 
V. Migration, the European ‘Public’ and Cognitive 
Dissonance 
 
A brief review of the research on migration and public attitudes 
in Europe (as distinct from that on ‘traditional immigration 
countries’ such as the US, Canada and Australia) suggests a 
number of anomalies. Immigration policy as practised by many 
governments remains relatively more ‘open’ and ‘liberal’ (despite 
its overall and growing restrictive character and practice) than 
public opinion would support. The public across Europe 
consistently and significantly overestimates the scale of 
immigration and yet there are widespread discrepancies in 
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attitudes across age, economic class and level of education 
(Penninx, Spencer and Van Hear 2008:4-5, Facchini, G and 
A.M.Mayda 2008:2-4).  
 
The 2014 Report of the Director General of the ILO raises 
similar points and observes: 
 
‘…Policy initiatives addressing migration frequently run 
up against a marked divergence between widely 
demonstrated economic benefits of migration and equally 
widely held public opinion regarding its negative impact. Is 
this simply the consequence of a mismatch of objective 
realities and subjective opinions, or is something else in 
play?’  
(ILO 2014:4) 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a steady if uneven growth in 
anti-immigration movements among populist groups within the 
context of broader anti-globalisation and European integration 
sentiments. This movement grew in importance in the context of a 
low-turnout 2014 EU elections where their representation 
increased suggesting a ‘boiling over’ of long simmering anti-
immigration sentiment across the EU. How should this be 
understood and what are its implications for migration in the 
decades ahead? Is it simply the manipulation of public opinion by 
a series of ‘political entrepreneurs’ seeking to achieve political 
advantage over more traditional parties or are there important 
issues and challenges for migration policy and for integration 
strategies? 
 
At the outset it is clear that advances in understanding of the 
multiple contributions of migration to development amongst 
researchers, policy makers and analysts have not kept pace with 
public perceptions (and experiences). The public discussion of the 
issues appears to be significantly impervious to factual realities – 
many (but by no means all) people still believe that migrants are 
far more numerous than they are in fact and that they consistently 
benefit from social welfare provisions than local populations 
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(Facchini and Mayda 2008, Fargues 2014). Recent experience of 
economic recession, increased unemployment (especially in some 
hardest hit sectors) and the significant cutbacks in public services 
in some states have helped fuel anti-immigrant sentiment. In such 
circumstances the simple challenging of misperceptions and 
misinformation with ‘hard facts’ is most unlikely to achieve the 
desired results. A far more nuanced and sophisticated analysis of 
how the public comes to judgement on this issue is required and 
thus how strategies for engagement are designed and delivered. 
 
The research to date suggests a number of trends and patterns 
which require considerably more research and analyses in order to 
more effectively shape and govern public discussion, public 
judgement and public policy. According to Facchini and Mayda 
economic considerations outweigh non-economic considerations 
in public attitudes; only a minority favour more open policies; pro-
immigration lobbies remain important in influencing the 
government policy (those from industry, non-governmental 
organisations and already established diaspora groups (2008:3-4). 
Penninx, Spencer and Van Hear highlight the different characters 
and contexts of public attitudes across different sets of countries – 
those older, established immigration countries (the US, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) which have an established 
immigration culture with well-established policies; northern 
European countries with either an established colonial history or 
which, for economic reasons, have well-established labour 
migration needs and networks and, finally, those ‘new’ 
immigration countries (such as Ireland, Poland, Spain, Italy and 
Malta) which have been until recently net emigration countries 
(2008:5). Evidence to date also suggests (but is by no means 
conclusive) that attitudes to immigration vary across educational 
levels, age (with younger groups tending, in the main to be more 
tolerant) and location - urban versus rural (Fetzer 2011). 
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